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This paper concerns redistribution and provision of public goods in an economic 
federation with two levels of government: a local government in each locality and a 
central government for the economic federation as a whole. We assume that each 
locality is characterized by two ability-types (high and low), and that their distribution 
differs between localities. The set of policy instruments facing the central government 
consists of a nonlinear income tax and a lump-sum transfer to each local government, 
while the local governments use proportional income taxes and the transfers from the 
central government to finance the provision of local public goods. The purpose is to 
characterize the tax and expenditure structure in a decentralized setting, where the 
central and local governments have distinct roles to play, and also compare this tax and 
expenditure structure with the second best resource allocation. We show how the 
redistributive role of taxation is combined with a corrective role, since tax base sharing 
among the central and local governments gives rise to a vertical fiscal external effect. In 
addition, the central government does not in general implement the second best resource 
allocation with the instruments at its disposal. 
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Ever since the seminal article by Mirrlees (1971), there has been a steady development 
of our understanding of how redistribution via nonlinear income taxation can be 
obtained in an efficient way. Part of this literature also addresses how an efficient 
nonlinear income tax interacts with commodity taxes and public provision of public and 
                                                           
* A research grant from Tom Hedelius and Jan Wallander’s foundation is gratefully acknowledged. 
α Department of Economics, Umeå University, SE – 901 87 Umeå, Sweden 
β Department of Economics, Uppsala University, Box 513, SE – 751 20 Uppsala, Sweden.   2
private goods. Meanwhile, most previous studies have dealt with ‘unified’ economies, 
in which there is no distinction between different levels in the public sector. This is 
somewhat surprising considering that countries are often characterized by geographical 
localities and/or regions that are allowed to collect local taxes and provide local public 
services. The idea of extending the optimal income tax problem to an economic 
federation (with a distinction between central and local governments) is interesting from 
a theoretical point of view, since it opens up for the use of additional policy instruments 
in comparison with the traditional optimal income tax model. It is also interesting as a 
complement to previous studies on optimal public policies in economic federations, 
which typically use proportional tax instruments and/or disregard the possibility of 
asymmetric information. The purpose of this paper is to extend the theory of optimal 
nonlinear income taxation and provision of public goods to a framework, where part of 
the decisions in the public sector are made by local governments. 
 
An important resource allocation problem that often characterizes economic federations 
is vertical fiscal external effects
1, which arise from tax base sharing among different 
levels in the public sector. Typically, local governments neglect that increases in the 
local income tax rates reduce the tax base of the central government, implying a 
tendency to underestimate the marginal cost of public funds
2. Therefore, to reach the 
socially optimal resource allocation within the given fiscal structure, it is necessary for 
the central government to try to influence the decisions made by the local governments. 
This idea was brought to attention by Hansson and Stuart (1987) and Johnson (1988). 
Several authors have addressed the policy options available to the central government, 
in case vertical fiscal external effects influence the resource allocation. Boadway and 
Keen (1996) assume that both the central and local governments use proportional 
income taxes, and that the central government can transfer resources lump-sum between 
the two levels in the public sector. They also assume that the localities are identical, and 
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that each locality can be characterized by a representative agent
3. Their results show that 
the central government can implement the second best resource allocation by choosing 
its own income tax rate to be equal to zero, i.e. only the local level of government 
collects tax revenues by means of distortionary taxes, whereas the central government 
collects resources lump-sum from the local governments in order to finance its own 
expenditures. The latter means, in turn, that the optimal fiscal gap is negative. Other 
studies have focused the attention on the potential role of transfer schemes as well as on 
other tax instruments. For instance, Aronsson and Wikström (2001, 2003) show that 
proportional income taxation at each level of government can, in certain situations, be 
combined with an intergovernmental transfer scheme designed to induce the correct 
incentives
4. Similarly, in the context of commodity taxation, Dahlby (1996) proposes a 
matching arrangement in order to internalize a vertical fiscal external effect. 
 
Following Boadway and Keen (1996) and Boadway et al. (1998), our paper addresses 
an economic federation where both levels of government use income taxes, and the 
central government is able to transfer resources lump-sum between the two levels of 
government. The main difference is that the central government, in our case, has access 
to a (general) nonlinear income tax and solves its optimization problem subject to self-
selection constraints. We consider an extension of the two-type model developed by 
Stern (1982) and Stiglitz (1982), where the distribution of ability-types differs between 
localities. To be more specific, we assume that the central government uses a nonlinear 
income tax to redistribute income from high income earners to low income earners, 
whereas the local governments use proportional income taxes to finance the provision 
of local public goods. Each local government also receives a lump-sum transfer 
(positive or negative) from the central government. This setting is interpretable in 
several different ways. One is in terms of a federal structure such as U.S., whereas 
another is that the local governments represent municipal or regional governments of 
the type characterizing the Nordic countries. 
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In comparison with earlier studies, our paper contributes to the literature in primarily 
two ways. First, by introducing asymmetric information and allowing the central 
government to use a nonlinear income tax, we are able to extend the self-selection 
approach to optimal taxation into a policy problem for an economic federation. In our 
case, the decision by the central government to use distortionary taxation will follow 
from the structure of the model and not by assumption. Our framework also recognizes 
how the use of inflexible policy instruments at the local level may restrict the policy 
options of the central government. Second, contrary to the previous studies based on the 
self-selection approach to optimal taxation that we are aware of, our paper addresses 
heterogeneity both within and between local jurisdictions. 
 
The paper focuses on income redistribution, as well as on how the central government 
may modify its use of income taxation in order to correct for externalities associated 
with tax base sharing. To simplify the analysis as much as possible, we disregard 
horizontal interaction among the localities such as spillover effects of local public goods 
and labor mobility. In section 2, we describe the model. Sections 3 analyzes the second 
best policy in a benchmark version of the model, where all policy decisions are made by 
the central government, whereas section 4 concerns the public policies in a 
decentralized setting where a distinction is made between the central and local 
governments. Section 5 summaries the results. 
 
2. The Model 
 
Consider an economy with K localities. We adopt a two-type version of the optimal 
income taxation model, implying that each locality is characterized by high-ability 
individuals and low-ability individuals, and that the distribution of ability-types differs 
between localities. Individuals have identical preferences. This means that the utility 
function neither differs among ability-types nor among localities. The utility facing an 
individual of ability-type i in locality k is given by 
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where C is private consumption, l hours of work and g a local public good. We assume 
that the function  ) (⋅ U  is increasing in C and g, decreasing in l and strictly quasiconcave, 
as well as that all goods are normal. We also assume that the utility function is 
additively separable in the local public good. This assumption simplifies the analysis. It 
is also in line with several previous studies on optimal taxation and public expenditures 
in economic federations referred to in the introduction. 
 
The productivity of each ability-type does not depend on location, meaning that 
1 w  and 
2 w  (where 
1 2 w w > ) are the wage rates facing the two ability-types in all K  localities. 
The gross income of each ability-type may, nevertheless, differ between localities, since 
the income tax and, therefore, the hours of work may differ. In this paper, we would like 
to distinguish between the tax parameters of the central and local governments in a 
simple way, and we follow Marceau and Boadway (1994) by writing the individual 
budget constraints in their virtual form by linearizing them at the equilibrium. 
Furthermore, since the distribution of ability-types differs between the localities, we do 
not want to restrict the central government to tax all localities according to the same tax 
schedule. Therefore, instead of assuming that all individuals face the same national 
income tax schedule independently of location, it follows that possible differences or 
similarities between the localities with respect to the national income tax is a result of 
optimization. The national tax system facing ability-type i in locality k is summarized 
by two parameters: the marginal income tax rate, 
i
k τ , and an intercept term, 
i
k T − . This 
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where  k t  is the income tax rate decided upon by the local government. The consumers 
choose private consumption and hours of work to maximize utility subject to the budget 
constraint. By defining the hours chosen by ability-type i in locality k as follows; 
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the indirect utility function can be written as   6
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∂                      (3) 
 
To simplify the notations, we assume that the number of inhabitants is the same in all 
localities and normalize the population in each locality to one. However, the proportions 
of high-ability and low-ability types differ across localities. We denote the proportion of 
low-ability types in locality k  by  k π  and the proportion of high-ability types by 
) 1 ( k π − . By following the convention in much of the earlier literature on optimal 
nonlinear income taxation, we assume that the purpose of redistribution is to redistribute 
from high income earners to low income earners, implying that the most interesting 
aspect of self-selection will be to prevent the high-ability type from mimicking the low-
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                    (6) 
 
since  k k k k t l l ∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂ / /
1 1 1 τ , and where  ) / ( ˆ 2 1 1 2 w w l l k k = . 
 
In sections 3 and 4 below, we consider two versions of the taxation-provision problem; 
 
(i) Second best. This is basically a command optimum problem, where all decisions are 
made by the central government. The only informational constraint is that the 
government does not know whether a given individual is a high-ability or low-ability 
type. On the other hand, the government knows the proportions of high-ability and low-
ability types in each locality. The policy instruments facing the government are the 
parameters of the income tax function as well as locality specific public goods. 
 
(ii) Decentralized solution. This is intended to represent a federal structure with two 
levels of government. It is important to emphasize that the federal structure as such and 
the set of policy instruments will be taken as given in the analysis. Our concern is, 
instead, to study how the central government uses its policy instruments, when each 
local government is allowed to make independent decisions about taxation and 
expenditures. The policy instruments facing the central government are the parameters 
of the income tax function and lump-sum transfers to the local governments. Each local 
government provides a local public good, which is financed by a proportional income 
tax and the transfer payment from the central government. The federal government will 
be assumed to act as a Stackelberg leader, whereas the local governments act as 
followers. This seems reasonable in an economy with many small localities, where the 
consequences for the central government of the actions of a single local government are 
small, whereas the decisions made by the central government are important for each 
local government. 
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3. Second Best; centralized solution with locality specific public expenditures 
 
We assume that the central government faces a (generalized) Utilitarian social welfare 
function with different weights attached to the high-ability type and low-ability type, 
respectively. In addition, since all policies are decided upon by the central government, 
there is no need to use local income taxes and intergovernmental transfer payments. In 
terms of the model presented above, this means that the local income tax rates and the 
transfers from the central to the local governments are equal to zero. Accordingly, the 
second best model is formulated as if the central government chooses the levels of local 
public goods. 
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k V , 
2
k V , 
2 ˆ
k V , 
1
k l  and 
2
k l  were defined above. The first set of restrictions above 
constitute self-selection constraints, implying that the high-ability type in each locality 
is (weakly) better off by behaving as a high-ability type than by being a mimicker. Note 
also that, since the population in each locality is immobile, there is no need for other 
self-selection constraints than those referring to the incentives of the high-ability type to 
mimic the low-ability type in the same locality. The second restriction is the budget 
constraint of the government. Since the budget constraint is defined in terms of a sum of 
differences between the locality specific revenues and expenditures, it follows that the 
government is able to redistribute across the localities. As we mentioned above, another 
                                                           
5 An alternative formulation would be to assume that the government maximizes the utility of one of the 
ability-types subject to a minimum utility constraint for the other. We have chosen to use a social welfare 
function defined as the sum of the social welfare functions for the local governments (see below), which 
makes it easy to address the consequences of interaction between the two levels in the public sector. This 
assumption is also in accordance with several previous studies on public policy in economic federations.   9
important feature of the optimization problem is that the distribution of ability-types 
differs between localities. Therefore, we do not want to restrict the government to 
impose the same tax schedule in all localities. 
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To derive the marginal income tax rate characterizing each ability-type in each locality, 
we use equations (1)-(10) together with the first order condition for the hours of work 
facing each individual and the Slutsky condition, i.e. 
 





























































k w τ ω − = . Consider Proposition 1; 
 
Proposition 1: In a unified framework, where all policy decisions are made by the 
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Although Proposition 1 is derived in the context of an economic federation, within 
which the income distribution differs between the localities, the marginal income tax 
structure resembles that of a framework in which there is no distinction between 
localities. It is, nevertheless, important to emphasize that the tax structure has a local 
dimension. We can interpret Proposition 1 such that each locality has its own tax 
structure, with the marginal tax rate being positive for the low-ability type (since the 
mimicker has flatter indifference curves in consumption-income space than the low-
ability type) and zero for the high-ability type. The result that the localities have 
different tax structures is due to the assumptions that the income distribution differs 
between localities, and that the population in each locality is immobile. Therefore, there 
is no mechanism that ensures that the utility of each ability-type is independent of 
locality at the optimum, implying that the tax function will generally differ between the 
localities. Note that the localities would continue to differ with respect to tax schedules 
even if we were to introduce mobility across localities, as long as the mobility is not 
perfect. 
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Note finally that the simple structure of equation (11) depends on the assumption that 
k g  is additively separable in terms of the utility function. We will return to the 
condition for the provision of the local public good below, where equation (11) is 
compared to the corresponding condition in a decentralized framework. 
 
4. The decentralized solution 
 
We begin by describing the optimization problems facing the local governments and the 
central government, respectively. Having done that, we continue by examining the 
optimal policy for the central government. 
 
The optimization problems of the local governments 
 
Each local government decides on the rate of a proportional income tax,  k t , and the 
level of a local public good,  k g . Each local government also receives a lump-sum 
transfer,  k R , from the central government. The local governments act as Nash 
competitors to one another as well as towards the central government. The latter means 
that each local government treats the decision variables of the central government as 
exogenous. 
 
In accordance with the assumptions made above, each local government faces a 
generalized Utilitarian objective function. We can write the optimization problem for 
local government k as follows; 
 
2 2 1 1
, ) 1 ( k k k k g t V V Max
k k
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where the price of the public good has been normalized to one. We also add the 
nonnegativity constraints  0 ≥ k t  and  0 ≥ k g .  By substituting equation (13) into 
equation (12), we obtain a utility maximization problem in  k t  subject to the constraint 
0 ≥ k t . The first order condition is presented in the Appendix. If the nonnegativity   12
constraint does not bind, we can use the first order condition to solve for the local 
income tax rate 
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where the two wage rates and the parameters 
1 α  and 
2 α  have been suppressed for 
notational convenience. Finally, substituting equation (14) into equation (13), we obtain 
the equilibrium provision of the local public good. 
 
The central government 
 
The central government maximizes the social welfare function described in section 3 
subject to its budget constraint and the self-selection constraints, as well as subject to 
the restrictions that each local government obeys equations (13) and (14). The latter 
restrictions represent the reaction function for each local income tax rate and the budget 
constraint of each local government, respectively. In principle, therefore, the central 
government faces a classical optimal nonlinear income tax problem, with the exception 
that it must also recognize how the local governments respond to its policy. We can 
formulate the problem for the central government as 
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k l  and 
2
k l  are defined as above. The Lagrangean is given by 
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By collecting the terms that reflect the indirect effects of each policy instrument via  k t  
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where  1
k τ δ ,  1
k T δ ,  2
k τ δ ,  2
k T δ  and 
k R δ  represent the indirect effects of the central 
government’s decision variables via the reaction function for the local income tax rate 
and the local public budget constraint. These terms are defined in the Appendix. 
 
It is instructive to begin by analyzing the income tax structure without requiring that the 
transfer payments from the central government to the local governments must be 
optimally chosen. This enables us to study how the tax structure decided upon by the 
central government must be modified in order to recognize the decisions made by the 
local governments. It also simplifies the analysis of the intergovernmental transfer 
payments to be carried out below. By using equations (15)-(18) together with the 
properties of the indirect utility function discussed in section 2, we are able to   14
characterize the marginal income tax rates associated with the policy of the central 
government. Consider Proposition 2; 
  
Proposition 2: In a decentralized setting, the marginal income tax rates decided upon 
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for  K k ,..., 1 = . 
 
The tax policy implicit in Proposition 2 seems to differ from the second best policy. The 
reason is that the tax structure, in this case, reflects a mixture of self-selection motives 
for taxation and correction for the vertical fiscal external effect. In comparison with the 
tax structure that applies in the second best, which was discussed in connection to 
Proposition 1, each tax formula in Proposition 2 contains an additional term, which 
arises because the central government acts as a leader and recognizes how each local 
government responds to its policy. 
 
To provide some basic intuition, note that if  0 > i
k τ δ  ( 0 < ), this means that a higher 
marginal income tax rate imposed by the central government on ability-type i leads to 
higher (lower) welfare via the reaction function for the local income tax rate and/or the 
local public budget constraint. This provides an incentive for the central government to 
choose a higher (lower) marginal income tax rate for ability-type i  than it would 
otherwise have done. Similarly, if  0 > i
k T δ  (0 < ), ceteris paribus, a higher lump-sum 
component increases (decreases) the welfare via the reaction function for the local 
income tax rate and/or the local public budget constraint. Given the revenues to be used 
for the transfer payment, this means that the central government will have an incentive   15
to choose a higher (lower) lump-sum component and, therefore, a lower (higher) 
marginal income tax rate than it would otherwise have done. 
 
To go further, let us turn to the optimal transfer payments to the local governments as 
well as their implications for the marginal income tax rates. Our concern will be to 
analyze the additional terms in the marginal income tax formulas that are due to the 
reaction function for the local income tax rate and the local public budget constraint. Let 
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where  k µ  is interpretable in terms of a Lagrange multiplier associated with the policy 
problem of local government k ; as such, it represents the (perceived) marginal cost in 
utility terms of providing the public good in locality k . Consider Proposition 3; 
 
Proposition 3: If the central government is able to implement optimal lump-sum 
transfers to the local governments, then 
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Proof: See the Appendix. 
 
Since the two formulas in the proposition are analogous, we concentrate on the 
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is negative and contributes, therefore, to decrease the marginal income tax rate decided 
upon by the central government. The intuition is that tax distortions associated with the 
local public policy are exacerbated by the distortions imposed by the tax policy of the 
central government. This is seen by observing that increases in the local utility cost of 
providing the public good, the local income tax rate and the compensated labor supply 
derivative all contribute to make this expression larger in absolute value. As such, there 
is an incentive for the central government to choose a lower marginal income tax rate 
than it would have done in the absence of local income taxation. 
 
To interpret the second term on the right hand side of the first formula in Proposition 3, 
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let us combine the first order condition for the local income tax problem with the first 
order condition for the central government’s choice of lump-sum transfer to the local 















































τ π τ π γ γ µ
             (21) 
Note that the first order condition for the local income tax problem implies  0 , < R k t . As 
a consequence, the right hand side of equation (21) is negative, if (i) the labor supply 
curves are upward sloping, and (ii) the direct utility loss of the low-ability type 
following a higher local income tax rate exceeds the direct utility loss of the mimicker. 
In this case,  0 < −γ µk , which means that local government k overprovides the public 
good relative to the provision associated with using the second best formula. This 
means, in turn, that the vertical fiscal external effect is negative. 
 
Suppose that  0 < −γ µk . Then, if  0 /
1 < ∂ ∂ k k t τ  (0 > ), it follows that 
 










− −  
contributes to increase  (decrease) the national marginal income tax rate facing the low-
ability type. The intuition is, of course, that the central government has an incentive to   17
reduce the provision of the local public good. Similarly, if  0 /
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contributes to decrease (increase) the national marginal income tax rate facing the low-
ability type. This is so because, if an increase intercept part of the national marginal tax 
schedule works to decrease (increase) the local income tax rate, ceteris paribus, the 
national government will use more (less) of the intercept part than it would otherwise 
have done, in order to reduce the local provision of the public good, and then implement 
a lower (higher) marginal tax rate to meet the revenue requirement. 
 
It is interesting to compare the results derived here with those of previous studies. 
Boadway and Keen (1996) and Boadway et al. (1998) also analyze optimal taxation in 
an economic federation, where the central government can transfer resources lump-sum 
between the two levels of government. As in our study, they also assume that the central 
government acts as a Stackelberg leader, whereas the local governments act as 
followers. The main difference between these studies and our study is that, while our 
study is based on the assumptions that the central government is able to vary the income 
tax schedule between localities and faces a self-selection constraint for each locality, the 
other two studies assume that the central government uses a proportional income tax 
that is not allowed to vary between the localities. An interesting result derived by 
Boadway and Keen (1996) is that the central government can implement the second best 
resource allocation by choosing its own income tax rate to be equal to zero. This means 
that the local governments collect all tax revenues that are associated with the use of 
distortionary labor income taxation. As such, the vertical external effect disappears. The 
central government may, in turn, impose a lump-sum fee on the local government in 
order to finance its own expenditures (if any). 
 
In our model, the central government is not in general able to implement the second best 
resource allocation by using income taxation in combination with lump-sum transfers to 
the local governments. Note first that it is not an optimal strategy for the central 
government to choose its own marginal income tax rates to be equal to zero: such a 
policy does not implement the second best resource allocation derived in section 3. The   18
reason is that the nonlinear income tax is superior to proportional income taxes from the 
point of view of redistribution. Furthermore, in the second best model analyzed in 
section 3, the central government is able to control the consumption and hours of work 
for each ability-type as well as the provision of local public goods. In the decentralized 
setting, on the other hand, the central government must, in addition, try to control the 
local income tax rate, meaning that the set of policy instruments is not, in general, 
comprehensive enough to implement the second best resource allocation. Therefore, 
there is a need for an additional policy instrument: for instance, a tax or subsidy 
imposed by the central government that is proportional to the local income tax rate. 
 
So far, we have concentrated on the situation where  0 < −γ µk . However, since the 
local governments (by assumption) are not allowed to subsidize labor, there is a special 
case in which the central government is able to implement the second best. If each local 
government would prefer to underprovide the public good relative to the second best 
formula, and if the central government chooses the size of the lump-sum transfer to each 
local government to exactly correspond to the resources spent on the public good in the 
second best optimum, then each local government may choose a zero income tax rate. 
As such, both the expenditure side and the tax structure implemented by the central 
government will be those derived in section 3. Interestingly, this situation would also 
imply a positive fiscal gap. In the context of optimal taxation under vertical fiscal 
external effects, the optimal fiscal gap has previously been addressed by Boadway and 
Keen (1996), who for reasons described above found that the optimal fiscal gap is 
negative. Here, the opposite applies, since the central government is able to force the 





This paper concerns redistribution and provision of public goods in an economic 
federation. Contrary to previous studies dealing with similar issues, our analysis is 
based on an extended version of the two-type optimal nonlinear tax problem. The set of 
policy instruments facing the central government consists of a nonlinear income tax and 
a lump-sum transfer to each local government. The informational constraints are similar   19
to those characterizing previous studies on nonlinear taxation in economies without a 
federal structure: the governments are able to observe the gross income, while they do 
not observe whether a given individual is a high-ability type or a low-ability type. The 
local governments, on the other hand, use proportional income taxes and the transfer 
payment from the central government to finance a local public good. We also assume 
that the policy is decided upon in such a way that the central government acts as 
Stackelberg leader, and the local governments are followers. 
 
We would like to emphasize two conclusions; 
 
• In the second best resource allocation, where all taxes and expenditures are decided 
upon by the central government, the national tax schedule will generally differ between 
the localities. This result also remains in a decentralized framework, where both the 
central and the local governments have distinct roles to play. The reason is that the 
income distribution and, therefore, the costs of financing the local public good differ 
between the localities. Although our model is simplified in the sense that we disregard 
labor mobility, it is worth emphasizing that this result will remain, as long as perfect 
mobility is not feasible. 
 
• In a decentralized framework, the results do not necessarily imply that the marginal 
income tax rate of the low-ability type is positive, or that the marginal income tax rate 
of the high-ability type is zero (as they would be in the absence of local governments). 
The reason is that the redistributive role of taxation is combined with a corrective role. 
In addition, the set of policy instruments is not comprehensive enough to implement the 
second best in general: the nonlinear income tax and the transfer payment cannot be 
used in order to perfectly control the consumption and hours of work of both ability-
types as well as the public good, since the central government also must correct the 




The first order condition for the local income tax rate: 
 
Let us denote the objective function of local government k as   20
 
 
2 2 1 1 ) 1 ( k k k k k V V V α π α π − + =  
 
By substituting the budget constraint of the local government, given by equation (13), 
into the objective function, the first order condition for the local income tax rate can be 
written as 
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The Structure of Indirect Responses to the Policy of the Central Government: 
 
] ) 1 ( [ ]
ˆ
[























































































































































         (A2) 
 
 
] ) 1 ( [ ]
ˆ
[

























































































































































τ π τ π γ λ
α π
α π δ
          (A3) 
   21
] ) 1 ( [ ]
ˆ
[























































































































































         (A4) 
 
] ) 1 ( [ ]
ˆ
[

























































































































































τ π τ π γ λ
α π
α π δ
        (A5) 
 
 
] ) 1 ( [ ]
ˆ
[















































































































































τ π τ π γ λ
α π
α π δ
                 (A6) 
 
Proof of Proposition 3: 
 
Consider the part of the proposition that refers to the low-ability type. Taking the 
difference between  1
k τ δ  and 
1 1
1 k T l w
k δ , while using equations (A2) and (A3) together with 
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By substituting equation (A8) into equation (A7), we obtain 
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and substitute into equation (A9). By observing that  1 / = ∂ ∂ k k R g  conditional on  k t , we 
obtain the first formula in the proposition. The second formula can be derived in a 
similar way.C  
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